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THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
CHARLES R. MCMANIS*
In industrialized and developing countries alike, the interface between
international intellectual property and environmental protection is widely
perceived as one of fundamental conflict To many, two recently adopted
international conventions, one designed to strengthen international
intellectual property protection and the other to promote international
biodiversity protection, appear to promote two profoundly conflicting visions
for the future of "this fragile earth, our island home."'
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
Agreement, part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations,2 concluded on December 15, 1993. It seeks to strengthen
international intellectual property protection in order to promote world trade.
TRIPS also seeks to stimulate rapid international economic development that
will likely produce a virtual technological transformation of human society-
and perhaps much of the natural world. In contrast, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Biological Diversity ("Biodiversity Treaty"), 3
concluded on June 5, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, seeks to preserve the
natural world and maintain society's traditional, essentially agrarian,
relationship to it It also seeks to promote the concept of sustainable
development
The debate over TRIPS and the Biodiversity Treaty has exposed a series
of fault lines dividing technology-rich industrialized countries located in the
temperate zone of the Northern Hemisphere, and the biodiversity-rich
developing countries located primarily in the tropics and Southern
Hemisphere. Part I of this Article will describe two of the most visible North-
South conflicts, and Part II will examine the treaty provisions that have given
rise to these conflicts. Part III will examine the two specific issues that are at
* Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., Birmingham Southern College, 1964; M.A.,
J.D., Duke University, 1972. I would like to thank Nuno Carvalho, SJ.D., and Cheryl Rose, J.D.,
Washington University, for their invaluable research assistance.
1. THEBOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 370 (1977).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-
20 (1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Treaty].
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the root of these North-South conflicts, and will conclude with a more
cooperative vision of the interface between international intellectual property
and environmental protection.
I. THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. Objections by the United States to the Biodiversity Treaty
Shortly before the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro (the "Earth Summit"), then President George
Bush announced that the United States would not sign the Biodiversity
Treaty in part because the convention would impair American intellectual
property rights. The State Department released a contemporaneous statement
that complained that the draft created during negotiations held by the United
Nations Environment Program in Nairobi, Kenya, was seriously flawed in a
number of respects. Specifically, it focused on intellectual property rights "as
a constraint to the transfer of technology rather than as a prerequisite.'
'4
According to a representative of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office who
participated in the negotiations at Nairobi, the United States was "basically
stearnrolled" in those negotiations.5 The resulting Biodiversity Treaty as
offered in Rio de Janeiro presented a serious risk of interfering with
intellectual property principles that the United States sought to promote in the
TRIPS component of the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
6
Although the Clinton administration eventually did sign the Biodiversity
Treaty on June 4, 1993,7 it did so only after a number of U.S. pharmaceutical
and biotechnology firms and organizations that were previously opposed to
the Biodiversity Treaty changed their position. These companies feared that
continued opposition to the treaty might simply exclude U.S. companies
from opportunities to explore genetic resources in developing countries, and
exclude the United States from future negotiations to interpret the exact
meaning of the treaty. Accordingly, these organizations joined a business-
environmental coalition urging President Clinton to sign the Biodiversity
4. Convention on Biological Diversity, in 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 423 (1992).
5. See Treaties: PTO, Biotech Group Explain Objections to Earth Summit's Biodiversity Treaty,
44 Pat. Trademark & Copyright 3. (BNA) 120 (June 11, 1992).
6. For a discussion of the larger question of the interface between international trade and
environmental protection, see Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and
Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535 (1992).
7. See Public Supports U.S. Signature of Biodiversity Treaty at United Nations Today; Study
Says 78 Percent Support President's Action, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 4, 1993, available in 1993 WL
7130279.
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Treaty and issue a simultaneous interpretive statement making it clear that
the United States construes key sections of the treaty in a way that protects
intellectual property rights! When the United States signed the treaty, the
Clinton administration issued a statement promising to address intellectual
property issues in a forthcoming interpretive document.9 The White House
eventually stated that proposed legislation for ratification of the treaty would
spell out the administration's interpretation of the treaty, reflecting the major
concerns about the need to protect intellectual property rights. 10 After this
statement, the Biodiversity Treaty essentially dropped off the U.S. political
and legislative radar screen. Congress has not ratified the treaty, nor has the
Clinton Administration put the treaty forward.
B. Objections in India to the TRIPS Agreement
A few months after the U.S. policy reversal on the Biodiversity Treaty,
and just as the long-stalled Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was
finally concluded, the developing world reacted to the U.S. efforts to
strengthen international intellectual property protection throughout the
Uruguay Round. In India the reaction was so vehement that not even an
earthquake that had rocked the center of the country in October, 1993,
"prevented half a million farmers from turning out in the central Indian city
of Bangalore, to protest against the patenting of agricultural products."" The
Karataka State Farmers Association, headed by a charismatic scholar-
activist, M. D. Nanjundaswamy, organized the protest. The Association said
that the farmers were "demonstrating for collective, not individual control
over seeds and plants," and specifically targeted the U.S.-based chemical
company, W.R. Grace, as the focus of their protest.1
2
The immediate source of the Indian farmers' complaint with W.R. Grace
was the medicinal neem tree of India, referred to as "the village pharmacy."
Some environmentalists, accusing W.R. Grace of "gene piracy," offered the
8. See, e.g., Genentech Joins Coalition in Favor of Biodiversity Treaty, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 15,
1993; Biodiversity Industry Wants US. to Sign Treaty by Deadline Even ifStatement Unfinished, 16
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 416 (June 1, 1993).
9. See As it Signs Rio Treaty, United States Callsfor Global Patent Protectionfor Biotech, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 961 (June 9, 1993). The plan on the part of the United States and the European
Community to issue an interpretive statement unleashed a storm of protest. See, e.g., Environment:
Biodiversit' Pact Change "Threatens Ecology" INTER PRESS SERVICE GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, July
16, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2538431.
10. See White House to Submit Biodiversity Bill to Congress, REUTERS TEXTLINE, Oct. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
11. John Tanner, India: U.S. Giant, Peasants Battle for "Blessed Tree", INTER PRESS SERVICE
GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 12, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2534808.
12. Seeid.
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neem tree as merely the latest "example of how the developing world [could]
end up paying for the preservation of world biodiversity and yet be robbed of
the chance [to] economically [benefit from it].' 3
Known to Hindus as "the curer of all ailments" and to Muslims as "the
blessed tree," the fast-growing evergreen tree, a botanical cousin of
mahogany, provides bark, flowers, and seeds used in traditional medicines.
Twigs from the neem tree are used by Indian peasants as antiseptic
toothbrushes, and oil is used in India as a natural insecticide, a contraceptive,
and in soap. Neem timber is resistant to termites. A 1992 report issued by the
National Research Council in the United States describes how neem could
fiction as "a tree for solving global problems."
14
A chemical called "azadirachtin," a natural insect repellant contained in
the seeds of the neem tree, is attracting the particular interest of international
chemical companies such as W.R. Grace, as well as scientific institutes in
India. W.R. Grace currently holds U.S. patents on a process for extracting the
chemical in the form of a stable emulsion or solution. Furthermore, it has
entered into a joint venture with an Indian company involving a plant in
Kamataka that processes neem seeds. In India, farmers simply smash the
seeds, soak them in water overnight, skim the emulsion off the top, and
throw it on their crops. 15 The process used by W.R. Grace gives the emulsion
a shelf-life and enables it to be transported to remote areas inhospitable to the
neem tree itself.
16
One concern of environmentalists is that W.R. Grace is building upon the
traditional knowledge of Indian farmers and not rewarding that knowledge in
any way. "'Without the Indian peasants knowledge of the medicinal and
pesticidal properties of [the tree], neem would just be another tree to Grace,'
Vandana Shiva, director of the Research Foundation for Science and Ecology
in New Delhi, was quoted as saying.' 17 Another major concern is that,
although current Indian law does not allow patenting of agricultural
products, the TRIPS agreement obliges signatories to provide protection for
plant varieties through the use of patents or an effective sui generis system of
protection. Environmentalists fear that the TRIPS agreement will eventually
take the control of neem seeds away from community groups and give it to
large corporations. "'Once a company starts developing a product like this
the supply becomes more restricted,"' said Nicholas Hildyard of the British
13. Id.
14. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEEM: A TREE FOR SOLVING GLOBAL PROBLEMS (1992).
15. See Tanner, supra note 11.
16. See id.
17. Id
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Ecologist magazine.' 8
The demonstrations over the neem tree and W.R. Grace proved to be but
a part of a wider, progressively violent, round of anti-GATT protests in India.
In 1993, after ransacking the Bangalore offices of U.S.-based Cargill
Company, members of the Karnataka State Farmers' Association reportedly
demolished part of a multi million dollar seed processing plant owned by
Cargill in the Karnataka town of Bellary. Immediately after the adoption of
the Marrachech Treaty in the Spring of 1994, scores of anti-GATT activists
reportedly ransacked and burned a subsidiary of the U.S. multinational Union
Carbide in Bangalore, to protest the new world trade order.' 9 Charges of
arson were believed to have been filed against fifteen members of the
farmers organization. The Association's founder, M. D. Nanjundaswamy,
was quoted as saying that the attack on Union Carbide was aimed at
"physically destablishing multinational companies" in India, and analogized
his movement to the one launched by Mahatma Gandhi against foreign
clothes during India's struggle for independence.20
Unlike the controversy over the Biodiversity Treaty in the United States,
the uproar over W.R. Grace's neem patent, and "gene piracy" in general, is
far from subsiding. In 1996, for example, a number of environmental
activists and international environmental groups filed petitions with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office and European Patent Office, seeking to
invalidate the W.Rt Grace patent, claiming that its novelty "exists mainly in
the context of the ignorance of the West."2' At the same time, international
environmentalists have issued insistent calls for the recognition and
development of traditional resource rights for indigenous peoples and local
groups.
22
In order to evaluate the concerns of international environmentalists,
Indian farmers, and those of the United States over the interface between
international intellectual property and environmental protection, it is first
necessary to examine in some detail the specific provisions of the
Biodiversity Treaty and the TRIPS Agreement that have given rise to the
North-South controversy.
18. Id.
19. See Anti-GATT Activists Ransack Union Carbide Office, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 16,
1994, available in 1994 WL 9531059 (reporting the earlier attack on Cargill, as well as the more
recent attack on Union Carbide).
20. Id.
21. See generally Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art
and the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 375 (1997).
22. See, e.g., infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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II. THE BIODIVERSITY TREATY AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. The Biodiversity Treaty
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity is but one of a
matched pair of conventions that were opened for signature at the Earth
Summit The companion Framework Convention on Climate Change
requires countries (primarily those in the industrialized world) to limit net
emissions of greenhouse gases and facilitate transfer of environmental
technology to the developing world. The Biodiversity Treaty, in turn,
obligates countries (primarily those in the developing world) to conserve,
sustainably use, and guarantee access to genetic resources, in return for a fair
and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of those
resources.
3
Article 1 of the Biodiversity Treaty states that its three objectives are (1)
the conservation of biological diversity, (2) the sustainable use of its
components, and (3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
of the utilization of genetic resources through such means as (a) appropriate
access to genetic resources, (b) appropriate transfer of relevant technologies,
and (c) appropriate funding.24 Article 3 states as a general principle that
States have a "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and a responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."25
Articles 4 and 5 specify the jurisdictional scope of the Convention and
obligate parties to the Convention to cooperate in the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. Articles 6 through 14 set forth various
measures. for promoting the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity,
the first and second objectives of the Convention. Articles 15 through 21, in
turn, address the three essential components needed to assure the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources, the third and final objective of the Convention.26
23. For a general discussion of the limited accomplishments of the Earth Summit and the
difficulties encountered there, see Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Earth Summit: What Went Wrong at Rio?,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005 (1992). For an analysis and the complete text of the Biodiversity Treaty, see
Michael Gollin, The Convention on Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property Rights, in
BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 289-
302 (1993).
24. See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 1.
25. Id. at art. 3.
26. Seeki. at art. 15-21.
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Specifically, Article 15 requires parties to the Convention "to facilitate
access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses. 27 Together with
the measures contained in Articles 6 through 14 providing access to genetic
resources is the primary obligation of biodiversity-rich, technology-poor
parties to the Convention.
In return, Article 16 spells out the obligation to provide and/or facilitate
access to, and transfer of, technologies that are either relevant to the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, or make use of
genetic resources.29 Articles 17 through 19 obligate parties to facilitate the
exchange of information, promote technical and scientific cooperation, and
provide for the handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits.30
Articles 20 and 21 require parties to provide financial support and incentives
for activities intended to achieve the objectives of the Convention.31
Together, Articles 16 through 21 spell out the obligations of technology-
rich/biodiversity-poor parties to the Convention. The remaining articles of
the Convention deal with various other housekeeping matters concerning the
implementation of the Convention.
32
Article 16 is the article most explicitly concerned with the interface
between intellectual property and environmental protection. It details what
constitutes appropriate access to, and transfer of, technology in five
paragraphs. Article 16(1) states that both access to and transfer of
technology, including biotechnology, among the parties to the Convention
are essential elements for the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.
It further directs that the parties to the Convention undertake to provide
and/or facilitate access for or transfer of technologies that (a) are relevant to
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or (b) make use
of genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the
environment.33
Article 16(2) specifies that:
access to and transfer of technology ... to developing countries shall
be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms,
including on concessional and preferential terms where mutually
agreed, and, where necessary, in accordance with the financial
27. Id. at art. 15.
28. See id. at art. 6-14.
29. See id. at art. 16.
30. See id. at art. 17-19.
31. See id. atart. 20-21.
32. See id at art. 22-42 and Annex. I & 11.
33. See id. at art. 16.
1998]
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mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21. In the case of
technology subject to patents and other intellectual property rights,
[however, Article 16(2) specifies that] such access and transfer shall
be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights[, but
goes on to state that t]he application of this paragraph [is to] be
consistent with [the remaining three paragraphs of Article 16.] 34
Article 16(3) requires:
each contracting party [to] take legislative, administrative or [other
policy] measures ... with the aim that [those] parties, in particular
those that are developing countries, which provide genetic resources
are[, in turn,] provided access to and transfer of technology which
makes use of those resources, on mutually agreed terms, including
technology protected by patents and other intellectual property
rights.35
The paragraph goes on to state, however, that such measures must be in
accordance with international law and consistent with the remaining two
paragraphs of Article 16.36
Article 16(4) requires each party to take measures with the aim that the
private sector, as well as the government parties themselves, both (a)
facilitate access to and/or joint development and transfer of technology
referred to in Article 16(1) for the benefit of both governmental institutions
and the private sector of developing countries, and (b) abide by the
obligations included in the first three paragraphs of Article 16.
Finally, Article 16(5) states that parties to the Convention, "recognizing
that patents and other intellectual property rights may have an influence on
the implementation of [the] Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject
to national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights
are supportive of and do not run counter to [the] objectives" of the
Convention.38
The United States was concerned, primarily because of the language of
Article 16, that the Convention focused on intellectual property rights "as a
constraint to the transfer of technology rather than as a prerequisite." 39 The
34. Id. at art. 16(2).
35. Id. at art. 16(3).
36. See id. at art. 16(3).
37. See id. at art. 16(4).
38. Id. atart. 16(5).
39. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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U.S. biotechnology industry voiced a two-fold objection to the Convention,
alleging that it (1) provides a basis for the parties, particularly developing
countries, to reduce intellectual property protection, and (2) opens the door to
compulsory licensing arrangements by them that go against established
norms.
40
However, in retrospect-particularly in light of the eventual successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations-it appears that
those supporters of the Biodiversity Treaty who accused the United States of
"reading demons" into the text"' were correct. As a leading U.S.
commentator on the Biodiversity Treaty has noted, "any country that
interprets Article 16 as requiring involuntary transfer of technology must be
prepared for the counter-argument that the similar language in Article 15
requires involuntary transfer of genetic resources, a result no source country
would happily accept."
42
This commentator points out that the access to genetic resources required
by Article 15, as well as any transfers pursuant to paragraphs two, three, and
four of Article 16 on any terms beyond those that are "fair and most
favourable" (i.e. commercially reasonable and non-discriminatory), are all to
be carried out as "mutually agreed" or "on mutually agreed terms."43 Article
16(2), for example, calls for transfers of technology on concessional and
preferential terms only "where mutually agreed," and further states that in the
case of technology subject to patents and other intellectual property rights,
access and transfers must be "consistent with the adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights." 4
Similarly, Article 16(3) specifies that the access to and transfer of,
technologies that use genetic resources to countries that provide those genetic
resources must be carried out "on mutually agreed terms."A5 Although such
technologies are to include those "protected by patents and other intellectual
property rights," access to and transfers of such technologies are to be carried
out "in accordance with international law" as well as in a manner consistent
with paragraphs 4 and 5.46 Article 16(4), in turn, qualifies the obligation to
40. See Objections to Earth Summit's Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 5.
41. See Rebecca L. Margulies, Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellectual
Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 322, 337 (1993) (quoting Dianne
Dumanoski & John Mashek, U.S. is Isolated in Opposing Biodiversity Treaty, BOSTON GLOBE, June 6,
1992, at 4).
42. Gollin, supra note 23, at 295.
43. Id. at 296-97.
44. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 16(2).
45. Id. at art. 16(3).
46. Id.
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"take . .. measures, as appropriate, with the aim that the private sector
facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of technology, ' 7 by
stating that in this regard parties to the Convention are to abide by the
obligations contained in paragraphs one, two, and three-including,
presumably, all of the qualifications contained in those paragraphs, such as
the requirement that transfers be on "fair and most favourable" or otherwise
"mutually agreed" terms.
Finally, with respect to Article 16(5), the negotiating history shows that
the paragraph was merely adopted as a compromise between the two extreme
views: one, that intellectual property rights are essential for technology
transfer, and two, that they should be ignored.48 Thus, the paragraph is said to
represent an agreement to disagree for the time being on whether particular
intellectual property rights should be strengthened or weakened. The
unresolved issue was arguably deferred until, and eventually resolved by, the
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
49
As we have seen, some U.S. opponents of the Biodiversity Treaty
complained that the treaty provided a basis for developing countries to
reduce intellectual property protection and opened the door to compulsory
licensing arrangements by them that go against established norms.50 Yet they
ignored the fact that the only established international norm governing
compulsory licensing prior to the adoption of the TRIPS agreement in
1993-namely Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention-had itself opened the
door to compulsory licensing arrangements.51 Even in the United States,
patents and copyrights are subject to various compulsory licensing
provisions. The Copyright Act of 1976, for example, contains no less than
four separate compulsory licensing provisions, one of which was added by
amendment of the Act as recently as 1988.52 A specific example of
47. Id. at art. 16(4).
48. See Gollin, supra note 23, at 295.
49. See id.
50. See supra notes 5, 40, and accompanying text.
51. Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention states that "Each country of the Union shall have the
right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses
which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example,
failure to work." See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature
Mar. 20, 1883, last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. The TRIPS Agreement, by contrast, effectively eliminates the ability of
member countries to prescribe compulsory licensing for the mere failure to work a patent locally. See
infra note 59 and accompanying text.
52. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 115, 116, 119(b) (1988). These statutes discuss secondary
transmissions by cable systems, phonorecords of nondramatic musical works, coin-operated
phonorecord players, and statutory licensing for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers for
private home viewing.
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environmental compulsory licensing can be found in section 308 of the Clean
Air Act, which provides for compulsory licensing of patents upon
certification by the Attorney-General that (1) use of the patent is necessary to
meet emission standards set by other provisions of the Act; (2) the patent is
not otherwise available to potential licensees; (3) no reasonable alternative
means of achieving these reduced levels exist; and (4) to deny such licensing
would promote a lessening of competition.5 3 Finally, the Plant Variety
Protection Act empowers the government to compel a plant breeder to
license a novel plant variety to others at a "reasonable royalty," if "necessary
to ensure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed... [when] the owner is
unwilling or unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a price which
may reasonably be deemed fair.
' 54
Until the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, not only were there few
established international norms for compulsory licensing of intellectual
property, there were also virtually no established international norms
delineating what constituted adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights. The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (i.e., patents and trademarks) and the 1952 Universal Copyright
Convention are more important for having established the principle of non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals with respect to whatever
intellectual property protection a member country chooses to provide, than
for having established any particular minimum standards for the protection of
intellectual property. Indeed, it was the very absence of existing international
norms for adequate and effective patent protection that led the United States
to insist that convention parties consider this topic during the Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations.55
Conversely, now that the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations has
successfully concluded, the TRIPS Agreement arguably establishes precisely
the kind of international minimum standards for adequate and effective
intellectual property protection, including standards for the compulsory
licensing of patented technology,56 that the United States was so concerned
about during the debates over the Biodiversity Treaty. Accordingly, we must
now turn to an examination of those provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
53. See42U.S.C.§ 1857f-1 (1970).
54. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (1988). For a more detailed discussion of plant variety protection in the
United States, see infra text following note 95.
55. See, e.g., Richard A. Morford, Intellectual Property Protection: A United States Priority, 19
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 336, 339-40 (1989).
56. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31.
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B. The TRIPS Agreement
TRIPS Agreement sets forth specific standards concerning the
availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights. It includes articles
detailing what constitutes adequate patent and trade secret protection.
For example, Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement states that, subject to
various qualifying provisions contained in Article 27(2) and (3), "patents [are
to] be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application."58 Article 27(1) also emphasizes
that "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced."59
Article 27(2) states that
members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely
because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law.
60
Article 27(3) states that
members may also exclude from patentability (a) diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals, and (b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals
other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However,
members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
57. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATTs Unguay Round:
Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.. 171 (1993).
58. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1).
59. By forbidding discrimination on the basis of whether products are imported or locally
produced, Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement effectively supercedes Article 5 A.(2) of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which grants member countries of the Paris
Union "the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent
the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for
example, failure to work." Paris Convention, supra note 51, at art. 5A.(2). Although this article of the
Paris Convention appears to recognize the failure to work a patent locally as a valid instance of patent
misuse, Article 27 (1) specifically prevents WTO member countries from adopting such legislation.
The TRIPS Agreement also places significant restraints on compulsory licensing legislation generally.
See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
60. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(2).
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patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof.6
This latter proviso in Article 27(3) was the principle target of the protests by
the Kamataka State Farmers Association in India.
Article 28 includes among the exclusive rights that a patent shall confer
upon its owner the right to assign (i.e. transfer) the patent and to conclude
licensing contracts. Article 30 states that "members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."63 Article 31
states that, "where the law of a member [country] allows for other use of the
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
including use by the government or third parties authorized by the
government ' 64 (i.e., compulsory licensing), twelve detailed and burdensome
standards must be met. These standards are at least as demanding as the
standards set forth in the U.S. Clean Air Act for the compulsory licensing of
air pollution technology.
65
In addition to the articles obligating members to provide adequate and
effective patent protection and limiting the circumstances in which
compulsory licensing of patented technology can be authorized, Article 39 of
the TRIPS Agreement requires members to protect undisclosed information
(i.e., trade secrets), and data submitted to governments or government
agencies, in essentially the same manner that such information and data is
currently protected in the United States.66 Information must be protected if it
(1) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration
and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily
61. Id.atart.27(3).
62. See supra notes 11-12, 18 and accompanying text.
63. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 30.
64. Id. at art. 31.
65. For a summary of the provisions contained in the Clean Air Act, see supra note 53 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the most important requirements contained in Article 31, see
infra text accompanying and following notes 109-10.
66. Article 39 specifies that natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others with
their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note
2, at art. 39. A note accompanying Article 39 states that for purposes of this provision, "a manner
contrary to honest commercial practices" shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract,
breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed
information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such
practices were involved in the aquisition. Id.
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accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of
information in question, (2) has commercial value because it is secret, and (3)
has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances by the person
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
Article 39, together with obligations contained in Articles 27 through 31,
arguably meet the concerns expressed by the United States during the debates
over the Biodiversity Treaty. The only remaining question is whether the
concerns expressed by developing countries during and after the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations have also been met.
As the demonstrations by the Kamataka State Farmers Association in
India illustrate, developing countries have essentially two complaints about
efforts on the part of the industrialized world to strengthen international
intellectual property protection. The first stems from the perception that,
while raw genetic resources from wild and domesticated tropical ecosystems
of developing countries, and traditional knowledge of peoples indigenous to
those ecosystems, are being transferred freely to developed nations, the
commercially valuable substances and technology derived from these
resources by developed countries, as well as the environmental technology
developed by these same countries, are prohibitively expensive because of
the intellectual property protection afforded them. The developing world
views the industrialized world as freely engaging in gene piracy and
appropriating traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, while
simultaneously demanding that developing countries cease pirating the
industrialized world's intellectual property, at least some of which may be
based on the very genes and traditional knowledge that the industrialized
world itself has pirated.67
A second and more fundamental complaint of developing countries is that
the very premises of intellectual property protection are weighted in favor of
technological innovation that has come to characterize the industrialized
world, and against farmers in developing countries who have contributed for
generations to the preservation of species and to the improvement of them
through an incremental, informal, and highly collective form of agricultural
innovation that has contributed to genetic diversity, and yet is currently
thlreatened by genetically engineered monocultures that tend to erode genetic
diversity. Traditional agricultural innovation, like traditional knowledge of
67. As bandied about in the complaints of the North and South alike, the term "piracy" is a
loaded, and potentially misleading, term, as it implies the existence of an established rule of
international law, somewhat analogous to the prohibition against piracy on the high seas. In fact, until
the promulgation of the Biodiversity Treaty and the TRIPS Agreement, no such international norm
existed with regard either to intellectual property or gene piracy.
[VOL. 76:255
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss1/18
BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
indigenous forest dwellers, does not fit comfortably into the fundamental
conceptions and requirements of intellectual property rights, which have
traditionally protected individual human innovations (as opposed to the mere
discovery or collective manipulation of naturally occuring phenomena) and
conditioned protection on such criteria as inventiveness, or at least novelty,
uniformity, and stability. Indeed, traditional agricultural innovation may be
threatened, along with the very biodiversity that it has helped maintain, by a
system of intellectual property protection that tends to reward the
development of new and genetically improved, but highly uniform, and
therefore potentially vulnerable, monocultures.
In response to both of these concerns, Article 16(5) of the Biodiversity
Treaty recognized "that patents and other intellectual property rights may
have an influence on the implementation of this Convention," and obligated
parties to the Convention to "cooperate in this regard subject to national
legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are
supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives." 68 As we have seen,
however, this provision amounts to little more than an agreement to disagree
for the time being over the precise nature of the interface between
international intellectual property and environmental protection.69
Thus, the two specific legal issues concerning the interface between
international intellectual property and environmental protection appear to be
whether the other paragraphs of Article 16 of the Biodiversity Treaty
adequately speak to the first concern of developing countries that intellectual
property rights be made to support the objective of promoting the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources; and whether and to what extent the effort in the TRIPS Agreement
to strengthen international protection of intellectual property rights will
promote or undermine the objective of the Biodiversity Treaty to conserve
biodiversity and promote its sustainable use. The final part of this Article will
address each of these questions.
III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION INTERFACE
A. Sharing the Benefits of Genetic Resources
Notwithstanding the violent reactions of the farmers in India to the TRIPS
Agreement, a different, and more cooperative vision of the future of
68. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 16(5).
69. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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international intellectual property and environmental protection slowly
appears to be taking shape. Embraced by the business-environmental
coalition that was instrumental in changing the U.S. position on the
Biodiversity Treaty, a consensus is developing among scientists, world
bodies, anthropologists, and conservationists, that the best way for
developing countries to capture the benefits of biodiversity is through a
system of intellectual property, environmental, and contractual protection
designed to harmonize the goals of development and conservation by
building an international framework for sustainable biodiversity
prospecting.70 Arguably, this is precisely what Article 16 of the Biodiversity
Treaty is attempting to accomplish.7 '
A seminal example of the kind of venture envisioned by Article 16 is the
1991 agreement between Costa Rica's Institutio Nacional de Biodiversidad
("INBio"), a private, non-profit organization with close ties to the Costa
Rican government, and the U.S.-based pharmaceutical firm Merck &
Company, Ltd. ("Merck"). In this agreement, INBio agreed to provide Merck
with chemical extracts from wild plants, insects, and micro-organisms from
Costa Rica's conserved wildlands for Merck's drug-screening program, in
exchange for a renewable two-year research and sampling budget of
$1,135,000, and royalties on any resulting commercial products.72
INBio was created as a part of a broader Costa Rican conservation
program, organized on the premise that permanent preservation of
biodiversity depends on the benefits obtained from it. The stark choice, in the
words of an INBio staff member, is to "use it or lose it."
73
Costa Rica's conservation program consists of three consecutive but
overlapping steps. Each step is necessary but not sufficient for biodiversity
conservation, and each meets one of the three stated objectives of the
Biodiversity Treaty. The first step is to save samples of the country's
biodiversity through the establishment of a system of protected wildlands.
The second step is to know what that biodiversity consists of and where it is
located in these wildlands. The third step is to put that biodiversity to
70. See, e.g., John Vidal, The Gene Rush, TORONTO STAR, July 10, 1993.
71. See supra Section ll.A.
72. See Vidal, supra note 70. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
73. Dr. Ana Sittenfeld, Tropical Medicinal Plant Conservation and Development Projects: The
Case of the Costa Rican National Institute of Biodiversity (INBio), in MEDICINAL RESOURCES OF THE
TROPICAL FOREST: BIOVERSITY AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO HUMAN HEALTH 334, 335 (Michael L
Balick et al. eds., 1996). The paper was originally presented at the Rainforest Alliance's Periwinkle
Project Symposium on Tropical Forest Medical Resources and the Conservation of Biodiversity, held
at Rockefeller University, New York, Jan. 24-25, 1992. For a general discription of this symposium,
see CHRISTOPHER JOYCE, EARTHLY GOODS: MEDICINE-HUNTING INTHERAINFOREST 142-49 (1994).
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sustainable work for society.v4
The first step was achieved in Costa Rica through government
establishment of a System of Conservation Areas that comprise nearly
twenty-seven percent of the country. To bring about the second and third
steps, Costa Rica established INBio, which became formally incorporated on
October 24, 1989. INBio currently has a full-time administrative and
scientific-technical staff of sixty-six persons at its headquarters on the
outskirts of San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, and also benefits from part-
time and short-term consultants and volunteers from Costa Rica, and foreign
volunteer taxonomists and other professionals. Although the initial funding
for the organization came from government and private foundation grants,
INBio must eventually become self-supporting.75
In order to carry out a basic National Biodiversity Inventory, INBio is
forming an army of "parataxonomists," lay people of rural extraction who are
trained to collect specimens and gather information.76 The specimens and
information gathered by these parataxonomists are then analyzed and
organized by INBio curators and international scientists for eventual use by
the government or private sector. This widespread screening of Costa Rican
biodiversity for chemical and biotechnological resources that might be used
in medicine, agriculture, and industry is designed to enable biodiversity to
pay for itself.
The Merck-INBio agreement is just one of a growing number .of
cooperative biodiversity prospecting ventures around the world. A 1993
publication," for example, reported that Japan recently launched a major
biodiversity research program in Micronesia; that the U.S. National Institutes
for Health is screening wild species from around the world for compounds
active against Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("IIV") and cancer; and that
both Indonesia and Kenya are establishing inventory programs similar to
INBio's and exploring possible biodiversity prospecting activities. 78 This
same publication offers suggestions to governments, non-governmental
organizations, scientists, and industry for designing effective and equitable
74. For a discussion of the objectives of the Biodiversity Treaty, see supra text following note
23. For a detailed discussion of Costa Rica's conservation program and INBio, see WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT Chaps. 2 & 3 (1993). See also DAVID R. WALLACE, THE QUETZAL AND THE MACAW:
THE STORY OF COSTA RICA'S NATIONAL PARKS (1992).
75. See WALLACE, supra note 74, at 59.
76. For a detailed discription of one of these parataxonomists, see JOYCE, supra note 73, at 118-
21.
77. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 74.
78. See id. at 2.
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biodiversity prospecting programs, paying particular attention to the• ic79
experience of INBio in Costa Rica.
More recently, INBio is said to have concluded a second agreement to
supply Bristol-Myers-Squibb with a set of samples different from those it
collects for Merck, in return for a smaller advance payment but a higher rate
in future royalties.80 Also capitalizing on biodiversity prospecting are a
number of commercial ventures, including a company called Shaman
Pharmaceuticals, a small California company, which describes itself as an
ethnobotanical drug company that bases its drug exploration primarily on
plants used in traditional medicines by indigenous peoples.8' In less than two
years, the company reportedly had three compounds in development as
drugs, and seventy more in the pipeline from over one hundred plants
brought in by Shaman's collectors. At a January, 1992, meeting of the
Rainforest Alliance, the environmental group Shaman announced the
company's first commercial success, an antiviral agent called SP-303 that
targets respiratory diseases.
82
The company is vague about what plant SP-303 is derived from,
apparently treating the information as a valuable trade secret, but says that it
grows wild, like a weed, and can be found in Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay,
Columbia, and Mexico.83 Another of the company's more promising
products is an anti-fungal agent derived from a species commonly used as a
folk remedy in Peru and parts of Mexico. The agent derives from resin in at
least two species of trees of the genus, Virola, in the tree family
79. See also DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DuTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
(1996).
In 1995, the author was privileged to sit in on negotiations conducted among parties to the
International Cooperative Biodiversity Group ("ICBG") Project, composed of Washington University,
the Museum of Natural History of the National University of San Marcos, the Peruvian University
Caytano Heredia, the Central Organization of Aguaruna Communities of the Upper Maranon, the
Federation of Native Aguaruna Communities of the Nieva river, and the Aguaruna Federation of the
Domingusa River, in affilation with the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru. The basic
document governing the ICBG Project is a 1994 Biological Collecting Agreement among the parties
that acknowledges a separate License Option Agreement between Washington University and G.D.
Searle & Co., a U.S. pharmaceutical company.
As a result of the 1995 negotiations, the 1994 License Option Agreement was amended, and the
representatives of the Aguaruna and Huambisa communities of Peru and Searle entered into a new
Know-how Licensing Agreement governing disclosure of the knowledge, innovations, practices,
expertise, and secrets of these communities with regard to the use of biological resources for medicinal
purposes. A redacted copy of the basic Biological Collecting Agreement, the 1996 Amendment
Agreement, and the Know-how License Agreement are on file with the author.
80. See JOYCE, supra note 73.
81. See id. at 146-47, 270-71; see John Vidal, supra note 70.
82. See JOYCE, supra note 73, at 146-47.
83. See 1d.
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Myristicaceae, which also includes nutmeg and mace. The company has
entered into prospecting contracts with Eli Lilly and Merck, which give
Shaman patent ownership rights while the pharmaceutical companies
received the right to market drugs derived from compounds that Shaman
discovers.
84
Perhaps the most ambitious biodiversity prospecting venture yet is the
five-year, eight million dollar program being carried out by the U.S. National
Cancer Institute ("NCI") to screen 10,000 substances against 100 cancer cell
lines and HIV.85 NCI is taking an eclectic approach to biodiversity
prospecting, funding both ethnobotanists associated with the New York
Botanical Garden, and "eco-rationalists" associated with the Missouri
Botanical Garden in St. Louis, who favor using clues from the forests' own
organisms to track down drug candidates. Together with a third group from
the University of Illinois, these non-profit research institutions have agreed to
concentrate their search efforts for plants in Central and South America,
Africa, and Asia, respectively. In addition, NCI has retained several marine
biologists to search for new compounds from the ocean, coral reefs, and.
seaweed thrown up on remote beaches.
The reason for this surge of biodiversity prospecting activity is simple.
About one-quarter of all prescription drugs in the United States contain as
their active ingredient a compound extracted or derived from plants. Sales of
these plant-based drugs amounted to an estimated $15.5 billion in 1990.86 In
Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States, the market value for
prescription and over-the-counter drugs based on plants in 1985 was
estimated at $43 billion. Around the world, almost 121 prescription drugs are
made from higher plants, almost half of which come from the tropics, and
seventy-four percent of which were discovered by following up on native
folklore claims.87
Less clear is what indigenous peoples and biodiversity-rich developing
nations in general will receive in the way of benefits from this surge of
biodiversity prospecting activity. The reason for concern over the question,
however, is abundantly clear. One of the more notorious recent examples
from a 350 year history of uncompensated takings is the widely reported
windfall that the U.S. pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly, netted thirty years
ago from the rosy periwinkle of Madagascar. In 1954, an Eli Lilly
84. See WORLD RESOURCES INsTrruTF, supra note 74, at 104.
85. For a detailed description of this program, see JOYCE, supra note 73, Chap. 12; see also
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 74, at 7.
86. See JOYCE, supra note 73, at 108.
87. See id.; see also WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 74, at 7.
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phytobiologist extracted two cancer-fighting alkaloids, vinblastine and
vincristine, from the flower. By the time the patents on the drugs ran out, Eli
Lilly had earned hundreds of millions of dollars from the sale of the drug
without providing any compensation to the impoverished and
environmentally endangered country of Madagascar.88 While representatives
of the U.S. biotechnology industry concede that such stories are now a thing
of the past, it remains to be seen whether there will actually be a fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the utilization of genetic
resources.
NCI, for example, offers a letter of intent to countries where its plant-
hunters engage in biodiversity prospecting, promising that if a plant becomes
a drug, the source country, or an institution in that country will have the
initial opportunity to supply the bulk material.89 NCI will also help train
scientists from the source country and will share details of its scientific
findings. But any patents on any chemical compound or the process for
making it will belong to NCI. Moreover, should NCI allow a drug company
to develop a compound into a drug or use it as a starting point to synthesize a
drug, NCI merely promises to use its "best effort" to assure that the source
country shares in the company's profits.
Many of NCI's plant-hunters are reportedly embarrassed by the terms of
the letter of intent9 These same plant hunters reportedly succeeded in
persuading NCI to tighten up a related "materials transfer agreement" that
drug companies would sign to gain access to NCI's repository. Originally,
the provision implied that any extracts that did not screen positively in NCI's
screening program would be distributed to any and all drug companies to do
with as they pleased. Eventually, NCI agreed to require all who obtained
access to the repository to follow the letter of intent. NCI acknowledges that
source countries want more firm guarantees of profit-sharing, but points out
that to the extent NCI holds a patent on a compound or process, it has the
power to choose and license companies that bid to develop drugs from that
compound or process. 91
Recently, NCI and the New York Botanical Garden signed their first
collecting arrangement with an indigenous group, the Awa people of
northwest Ecuador. The Garden will pay the Awa federation several
thousand dollars for the right to study medicinal botany with their shamans,
88. See Richard Stone, The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora's Box or Fair Deal? 256 SCIENcE
1624, June 19, 1992.
89. See JOYCE, supra note 73, at 255-56.
90. See id. at 256.
91. Seeid.
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who will also be compensated for collaborating.92
Meanwhile, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, though it decided that for the time
being it would not set royalties for any particular indigenous group and will
not reveal exactly how much compensation it intends to offer, says that
compensation will be in proportion to each group's contribution and how
much money a particular drug makes. In late 1993, Shaman secured the
confidence of one of South America's largest indigenous federations and
with the council of Peru's Aguarana and Huarnbisa peoples, who agreed to
help Shaman collect plants for pharmaceutical investigation.
93
While it is still too early to determine whether these biodiversity
prospecting activities will pay off and whether the compensation to
indigenous groups and developing countries will in fact be fair and equitable,
the limited experience of the past five years nevertheless seems promising.
B. The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection on Biodiversity
A more fundamental question raised in the North-South debate over the
interface between international intellectual property and environmental
protection concerns the effect that international intellectual property
protection will have on biological diversity. Opponents of intellectual
property protection have raised a number of arguments emphasizing the
negative impact that intellectual property protection, especially plant variety
protection, will have on plant diversity. Although the debate thus far has
focused primarily on the protection of domesticated plant varieties, the
arguments are equally applicable with respect to the effect of intellectual
property protection on wild plant varieties and on domesticated and wild
animal varieties as well. The arguments can be divided into those relating to
the conditions for protection and those relating to the effects of protection.94
Currently, plant variety protection is either provided by a country's patent
law or by a sui generis form of protection of the sort referred to in the TRIPS
Agreement, and embodied in the International Convention for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants (commonly called the UPOV Convention), which
was adopted in 1961 by various industrialized countries, and further revised
in 1972, 1978, and 1991, but as yet has not been adopted by any countries
from the developing world.95 In the United States, plant variety protection is
92. See id at 266.
93. See id. at 266-67.
94. For a detailed discussion of the effect of intellectual property on biodiversity, see Bernhard
Bergmans, Industrial Property and Biological Diversity of Plant and Animal Species, J. PAT. [&
TRADEMARK] OF. Soc'Y 600-09 (1990).
95. See generally Carlos M. Correa, Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights, 5
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provided by a combination of utility patent protection for biotechnological
inventions, plant patent protection for new and distinct asexually
reproducible plant varieties, and sui generis protection for sexually
reproduced plant varieties.96
Opponents of plant variety protection assert that the conditions for
obtaining protection require such uniformity and stability in essential traits as
to induce plant homogeneity, which causes a loss of diversity and creates a
greater risk of catastrophic vulnerability to diseases. Moreover, more
attention is said to be paid to the mere existence of differences in essential
traits than to their importance for the later use of the variety. This tends to
induce merely cosmetic alterations, rather than real improvements or true
diversification.97
The effect of plant variety protection thus creates a negative influence on
plant diversity by directing research and breeding techniques, as well as
marketing methods toward what is capable of being protected and
commercially profitable, rather than what is socially valuable. Commercial
breeding activities consist of cheap product differentiation, devoid of any real
diversification or improvement Only public institutions carry out the
fundamental research and breeding that makes up for the loss of diversity,
and yet, because protected varieties are widely marketed, existing varieties
are progressively abandoned. This situation is apparently worsened by
oligopolistic market structures in which a few large, multinational companies
sell the same varieties worldwide, including in developing countries, where
they replace more diversified indigenous varieties.
98
In order to evaluate the strength of these arguments, it is first necessary to
differentiate biodiversity according to the biological level at which it occurs.
Thus, one must distinguish botanical diversity, representing the number of
species in the plant kingdom and their characteristics; specific diversity
representing the number and nature of varieties belonging to species; varietal
diversity, representing differences between plants of the same variety; and
individual diversity, representing the degree of hetero- or homozygosity of an
individual plant
99
Because diversification is an ongoing process, it is also necessary to
distinguish the effects of plant variety protection according to three different
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP. 154-57 (1992). Discussion of the UPOV Convention in this section is based
primarily on this source.
96. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
97. See Bergrians, supra note 94, at 601-02.
98. See id at 602.
99. See id at 603.
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measures of diversity: potential diversity, representing whatever could exist
theoretically as a result of spontaneous variation or human intervention;
actual diversity, representing all that actually exists somewhere at a given
time, whether known or unknown to humankind; and effective diversity,
representing what is actually and significantly used or exploited as a natural
resource by humankind. Potential diversity merely represents the absolute
limits of diversification, even if human intervention, and the influence of
plant variety protection, were wholly positive. With respect to actual
diversity, it is clear that even if uniformity is imposed as a requirement for
plant variety protection, it could have adverse effects only on varietal and
individual diversity, which may occur in any event as a result of many other
factors even in the absence of plant variety protection. For example, the
"Green Revolution" in rice production has occurred primarily in developing
countries having no plant variety protection regime.
100
Conversely, creation of new plant varieties by definition increases the
actual diversity of species, and if genetic barriers can be eliminated through
genetic engineering, there will arguably be an increase of botanical diversity
as well. Again, however, other factors might lead to such increases in
specific and botanical diversity, even in the absence of plant variety
protection. In reality, however, most varietal improvements are restricted to a
few common species.' 0 ' Moreover, because the most recent revision of the
UPOV Convention now allows newly discovered, as well as newly bred
varieties to be protected, plant variety protection will not necessarily result in
the increase of specific diversity at all. 10 2 Finally, even if new varieties are
produced, not all new varieties necessarily will prove to be useful to
agriculture or horticulture.
Biodiversity thus must be examined with respect to the impact of plant
variety protection on the effective exploitation of existing plants. It is now
clear, as an unintended result of the Green Revolution, that the massive use
of a single variety, or of a few varieties, can in fact destroy botanical and
specific diversity among domesticated plants. Even if new, higher
performance varieties are continually created, moreover, there may be a shift
from one monoculture to another. This does not create diversity and may
result in the disappearance of existing varieties." 3
As we have seen, however, this phenomenon has occurred primarily in
developing countries without plant variety protection, suggesting that it is the
100. See id. at 603-05.
101. Seeid.at604.
102. See Correa, supra note 95, at 155.
103. See Bergmans, supra note 94, at 605.
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end user or consumer, and not the producer of plant varieties or the
availability of plant variety protection, that ultimately decides what varieties
will be used. Of course, the end user or consumer can only choose among
varieties actually available, and thus the role of the producer remains
important, particularly in an oligopolistic market.1' 4 But oligopoly is the
product of too little competition, rather than of too much plant variety
protection. Only if plant variety protection contributes to oligopoly market
conditions, by creating substantial barriers to entry, or is used
anticompetitively by oligopolies, can it have an adverse impact on
biodiversity. The primary barrier to entry created by intellectual property
law, however, is not sui generis plant variety protection, but rather patent
protection that is too strong and too wide.'0 5
As we have seen, under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, members are
allowed to provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system. 06 While the latest revision of the UPOV
Convention has broadened the scope of protection that member countries can
provide and given it a more patent-like character than is currently reflected in
the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act,1 7 the Convention nevertheless allows
members to qualify plant variety protection with both a narrow "farmer's
privilege," permitting "farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own
holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting on
their own holdings," and a broader privilege to use protected varieties for
experimental purposes and for breeding other varieties, though a breeder's
rights are to extend to any "essentially derived varieties."'
1 8
Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, moreover, explicitly permits
member countries to authorize compulsory licensing of patents when a
proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and such efforts have not
been successful within a reasonable period of time."19 Reading this provision
in conjunction with Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, which permits
measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders
or the use of practices that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology, demonstrates that Article 31 envisions
compulsory licensing as the principle remedy for the misuse of intellectual
104. See id. at 602.
105. See id. at 607.
106. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
107. See Reichman, supra note 57, at 196.
108. See Correa, supra note 95, at 156.
109. For a general discussion of Article 31, see supra note 64-65 and accompanying text.
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property rights.1 0 In recognition of this, Article 31(k) states that member
countries are not obligated to meet certain other compulsory licensing
conditions set forth in Article 31, where such licensing is designed to remedy
a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive.
Thus, while the concerns of environmentalists and farmers in India over
the adverse effects that massive use of a few protected monocultural varieties
might have on biodiversity are well taken, it is not plant variety protection,
but the absence of competition that poses this danger. Indeed, some experts
believe that, because the latest revision of the UPOV Convention extends the
field of application to the entire plant kingdom and not just species of interest
to individual countries, and extends protection to newly discovered as well as
newly bred varieties, greater use of the UPOV Convention framework to
stimulate commercial exploitation of botanical resources would in fact give
developing countries unique competitive opportunities. Also, enhancing the
value of natural species would promote the conservation of their natural
genetic endowment for future exploitation."' In short, plant variety
protection of the sort envisioned by the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV
Convention might very well have a positive influence on the conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity.
Thus, as we have seen, contrary to the widespread belief in the
industrialized and developing worlds alike, the interface between
international intellectual property and environmental protection need not be
one of fundamental conflict. Indeed, a proper understanding of the interface
between the Biodiversity Treaty and the TRIPS Agreement demonstrates that
adequate and effective international intellectual property protection can in
fact promote the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
110. See Reiehman, supra note 57, at 205.
111. See id. at 197 (citing Correa, supra note 95).
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